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THE RELATIONSHIP OF STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL
COURTS IN CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
J. RAND CLIFFE

Although a dual judicial system in America antedated the adoption
of the Constitution,' the concept of coordinate, and often competing,
courts between those systems was the unique product of that document.
"The system has proved amazingly workable, ' 2 but it has not been
trouble-free. Even at this late date questions arise concerning the relative positions of state and lower federal courts. Perhaps the most important area in which these questions have arisen is that of federal
question jurisdiction, especially the validity of state criminal statutes
and federal constitutional rights, for these represent an area in which
both the right of the sovereign state to regulate the conduct of parties
within its boundaries and the right of those parties to be free from
unconstitutional regulations of their conduct may be impinged. It is
the purpose of this paper to expose the dangers of leaving unsettled the
issue of what effect lower federal court judgments should have in
subsequent state court cases.
THE GENESIS AND CRISIS OF THE STATE-LOWER
FEDERAL COURT RELATIONSHIP

From the Constitutional Convention to Reconstruction the statefederal judicial conflict was a one-sided affair. The courts of the sovereign states were considered by many at the convention to be capable of
handling the new jurisdiction and consequent increased caseload to be
created by the Constitution.8 As a compromise measure, it was decided
that Congress could create a system of lower federal courts as it felt
the need. This was done almost immediately in the Judiciary Act of
1789. 4 But the federal courts which were created were inferior in every
aspect. Congress gave them no habeas corpus jurisdiction over state
prisoners,5 denied them federal question jurisdiction and it prohibited
them from enjoining state court proceedings.6 There was little reason
1 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACricE

0.6[2-1], at 207 (2d ed. 1959).

21d. at 201.
8 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1970) citing 1 FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

104 (1911).

4 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.

5 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82.
6 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
249
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for conflict between state courts and lower federal courts because there
was little concurrent jurisdiction and no way for lower federal courts
to either arrest a state court proceeding or nullify its judgment.
Although state courts steadfastly maintained the right to administer
their own laws, it was recognized early that lower federal courts might
assert the right to declare a state statute unconstitutional as an incident
to one of its jurisdictional powers.7 Real conflict did not appear, however, until Reconstruction, when fears of a possible deprivation of
constitutional privileges of state defendants led to the enactment of the
fourteenth amendment 8 and the extension of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction to include state prisoners.9 The lower federal courts were
empowered to temporarily enjoin the enforcement of a state statute, 10
even on an ex parte hearing, and in 1875 the lower federal courts were
finally given original federal question jurisdiction." The result of this
eight year period of federal jurisdictional expansion was a shift of
power from the state to the federal courts, making them the "primary
and dominant instruments for vindicating rights given by the Constitution ...."12
The states still bitterly resisted federal intrusions, especially with
regard to the enforcement of their criminal statutes. The reaction was
immediate in 1908 when the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young 18 and
Hunter v. Wood 14 held that a single federal judge could enjoin a state
official from enforcing an alleged unconstitutional state statute' 5 and
that federal habeas corpus was a proper remedy for anyone prosecuted
in violation of that injunction. 6 An abortive attempt was made that
year to remove all original federal question jurisdiction from federal
courts,' 7 for this was the jurisdiction most often utilized to attack the
constitutionality of the state statutes. This action failing, the state
court interests rallied behind the well phrased dissent of Mr. Justice
Harlan in Ex parte Young to force a compromise. Mr. Justice Harlan
had stated:
7 11 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (1922).
8 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, "...
nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
9 Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [1970]).
10 Act of June 1, 1872. ch. 255, § 7, 17 Stat. 197.
11 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1,18 Stat. 470 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [1970]). Lower
federal courts were given federal question jurisdiction in 1801, Act of February 13, 1801, ch.

4, § 11, 2 Stat. 92, but the power was withdrawn almost immediately. Act of March 8,
1802, ch. 8, § 1. 2 Stat. 132.
12 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and States Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 509 (1928).
'3 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908).
14 209 U.S. 205, 28 S.Ct. 472, 52 L. Ed. 747 (1908).
15 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148, 28 S. Ct. 441, 449, 52 L. Ed. 714, 724 (1908).
16 Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205, 210, 28 S.Ct. 472, 474, 52 L. Ed. 747, 754 (1908).
17 See 42 CONG. REc. 4849 (1908).
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[T]he courts of the States are under an obligation equally strong
with that resting upon the courts of the Union to respect and enforce the provisions of the Federal Constitution as the Supreme
Law of the Land .... We must assume-a decent respect for the
States requires us to assume-that the state courts will enforce
every right secured by the Constitution. If they fail to do so, the
party complaining has a clear remedy ... by writ of error to [the
United States Supreme Court].'
Mr. Justice Harlan argued that if the decision of the majority were
firmly established:
It would enable the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and
control the official action of the states as if they were "dependencies" . . . [and] ... would place the states of the union in a condition of inferiority never dreamed of when the Constitution was
adopted .... 19
The statute which resulted was a paragon of compromise. Thereafter,
a single federal district judge was without jurisdiction to hear a request
for injunctive relief from the enforcement of a state statute alleged to
be unconstitutional. Rather, three judges, one of whom was a circuit
judge, would be convened as a special district court with a right of
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 20 It was felt that this would not
only prevent the possibility that a single improvident federal judge
would nullify state legislation 21 but would also assuage the feelings of
the state court supporters by having a court of higher dignity hear the
suit. 22 The problem was settled; a special three-judge court was required to enjoin state enforcement of a state statute which that court
23
declared to be unconstitutional, and their decision was determinative.
The subsequent acquiescence of the state courts and prosecutors
appears strange in light of the furor which followed Young. Regardless
of its composition, the three-judge court was still only a district court.24
18 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 175, 28 S. Ct. 441, 460, 52 L. Ed. 714, 735 (1908).
19 Id. at 175, 28 S. Ct. at 460, 52 L. Ed. at 735 (1908).

20 Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281,
2284 (1970).
21 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250, 61 S. Ct. 480, 483, 85 L. Ed. 800, 804
(1941); Jacobs v. Tawes, 250 F.2d 611, 614 (4th Cir. 1957); Frankfurter, Distribution of
Judicial Power Between United States and States Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 510 (1928);
Comment, The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 426, 445 (1930).
22 Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 569, 48 S. Ct. 585, 586, 72 L. Ed. 990, 992 (1928);
Comment, The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 426, 445 (1930).
23 45 CONG. REc. 7258 (1910) (remarks of Sen. Overman of N.C.): "Whenever one judge
stands up in a State and enjoins the governor and the attorney-general, the people resent
it, and public sentiment is stirred, as it was in my State when there was almost a rebellion,
whereas if three judges declare that a state statute is unconstitutional, the people would
rest easy under it."
24 Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523, 541 (D. Neb. 1944),
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The suits it heard were usually pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction. Yet this jurisdiction was shared with the state courts, for the 1875
statute had failed to make it exclusive and the omission is interpreted
as a consent to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts. 25 The
effect was that after 1910, state courts were recognizing a superior right
in a federal court of equal rank2 6 to determine the constitutionality of
the states' statutes merely because of a procedural alteration to a direct
appeal and the addition of two members to the court.
In 1913 the state forces had succeeded in enacting a procedure
whereby the state courts could become the primary adjudicators of the
validity of their own criminal statutes by initiating a proceeding in the
state court to determine the validity of the state statute. 27 Upon notice,
the three-judge court would have to stay its proceeding pending the
diligent disposition of the state court case. However, acceptance of
federal court supremacy was demonstrated by the fact that this right
was not invoked in any of the 108 Young suits heard from29 1913 to 192628
and the statute is now deemed "virtually a dead letter."
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM: THE REACTION TO LOWER

FEDERAL COURT JUDGMENTS ON NON-CRIMINAL QUESTIONS

From 1910 to 1967 the states exhibited a particular respect for the
decisions of three-judge courts.30 During this period the question of
what weight a lower federal court decision should have in state courts
arose frequently. On principle, it may seem that if the Supreme Court
has not spoken on a particular federal question, the decision of a lower
federal court should be controlling.3 1 But a majority of state cases held
that decisions of lower federal courts on federal questions were not
aff'd, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809, 67 S. Ct. 622, 91 L. Ed. 691
(1947).
25 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 6(3), at 231 (2d ed. 1959); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130, 136, 23 L. Ed. 833, 838 (1876); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1, 25, 5 L. Ed. 19,

25 (1820).
26 Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235, 43 S. Ct. 79, 83, 67 L. Ed. 226, 232
(1922). Referring to state courts and federal district courts, the Court stated: "The rank
and authority of the courts are equal .... "
27 Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 1013 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2284[5] [1970]).
28 Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and States Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 518 (1928).
29 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 51, at 194 (2d ed. 1970).
30This writer was unable to find any instance during the period from 1910-1967 in
which a state court defendant was prosecuted under a statute previously declared unconstitutional by a three-judge court. But cf. Nobble v. Dibble, 205 P. 1049 (Wash. 1922),
one instance of state court disregarding a three-judge court as to a noncriminal state
statute.
31 "[P]ending review by the Supreme Court, the decisions of the subordinate federal
courts on constitutional questions have the authority of the supreme law of the land and
must be obeyed." Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 925 (E.D. La.),
aff'd, 365 US. 569, 81 S. Ct. 754, 5 L. Ed.2d 806 (1961). See 20 Am. JUR. 2d Courts § 230

(1965).
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binding upon them. 3 2 Perhaps the best reasoned argument is that state
33
courts themselves form an integral part of the federal judicial system.
Not only do they have concurrent federal question jurisdiction but
they are also bound under the supremacy clause to declare any of their
4
statutes unconstitutional that they find to be so.a

Another argument forwarded was based upon the fact that state
35
courts are not subject to appellate review by the lower federal courts.
Thus, they are coordinate courts with the lower federal courts and are
not obliged to follow lower federal court decisions or to give them any
more weight than the decisions of any other court which has no binding
authority upon them. Such decisions would be merely persuasive, if
36
well reasoned, and not binding.
There were state courts which stated that decisions of lower federal
courts are binding upon them, but they were not as unified in their
reasoning as the courts which held the opposite way. Some stated that
the binding authority of lower federal courts stems from the fact that
federal courts have the ultimate right to decide a federal issue.37 This
reasoning apparently extended to lower federal courts the same aura of
authority associated with the Supreme Court by virtue of their connection with that Court. 8s Other state courts offered no explanation as to
why they felt bound, seemingly extending the analogy of state court
supremacy with regards to state law to federal courts and the federal
question field.39
32 See State v. Cissna, 270 S.W. 963, 964 (Ark. 1925); Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of
San Diego, 336 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal. 1959); Colorado & S. Ry. v. Davis, 127 P. 249 (Colo. 1912);
Kenna v. Calumet Hammond & S.E.R.R., 206 Ill. App. 17, 25 (1917), aff'd, 120 N.E. 259
(Ill. 1918); Iowa Nat'l Bank v. Stewart, 232 N.W. 445 (Iowa 1930), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom., Iowa Des-Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 52 S. Ct. 133, 76 L. Ed.
265 (1931); Wells v. W. Union Tel. Co., 123 N.W. 371, 374 (Iowa 1909); Brown v. Palmer
Clay Prod. Co., 195 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1935); State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 49 A. 670, 672
(Me. 1901); Hangelias v. Dawson, 45 A.2d 392, 394 (Pa. 1946); Harrison v. Barngrover, 72
S.W.2d 971, 974 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1934, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 731,
55 S. Ct. 639, 79 L. Ed. 1260 (1955).
33 Kenna v. Calumet Hammond & S.E.R.R., 206 Ill. App. 17, 25 (1917), afl'd, 120 N.E.
259 (111. 1918).
34 City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed,
348 U.S. 906, 75 S. Ct. 292, 99 L. Ed. 711 (1955).
35 Hanna v. Homes Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
838, 81 S. Ct. 751, 5 L. Ed. 747 (1961); Young v. Wainwright, 320 F. Supp. 80, 85 (S.D. Fla.
1970); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. La.
1961), rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S. Ct. 461, 11 L. Ed.2d 440 (1964).
36State v. Cissna, 270 S.W. 963, 964 (Ark. 1925); Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San
Diego, 336 P.2d 521, 524 (Cal. 1959); Colorado & S. Ry. v. Davis, 127 P. 249, 250 (Colo.
1912); Kenna v. Calumet Hammond & S.E.R.R., 206 Ill. App. 17, 26 (1917), afl'd, 120 N.E.
259 (Ill. 1918).
37 "The question of whether a law enacted by the Legislature of a state contravenes the
federal Constitution is ultimately a question for the federal courts to determine, and their
decision upon that question is binding upon every state court." Hofer v. Carson, 203 P.
323, 325 (Ore. 1922); see Massey v. War Emerg. Co-operative Ass'n, 39 S.E.2d 907, 912
(S.C. 1946).
38 Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court Jurisdiction, 63 MICH. L. Rv.
1203, 1212 (1965).
39 See Breeding v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 9 So. 2d 6, 7 (Ala. 1942); Handy v. Good-
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But the issue has been further confused as to whether all lower federal court judgments are to be given the same effect or whether those
dealing exclusively with the constitutionality of state criminal laws
might not be of more weight. The reasoning of state courts feeling no
constraint to follow the decisions of a lower federal court is not without
merit. They simply do not want any authority less than the Supreme
Court to effectively nullify the product of a sovereign state's legislative
and judicial system. 4 0 But the lower federal courts have never presumed
to establish themselves as superior in any theoretical order of procedure. 41 They are, however, the primary interpreters of a superior federal law and Constitution and as such their decisions have commanded
respect.4 2 But whether the same supremacy clause which places federal
law and the Federal Constitution above state law also elevates lower
federal court interpretations of that Constitution is the issue that has
increasingly appeared since 1967.
There has been a new rash of state court assertions of independence,
most notably with regard to decisions of three-judge courts. For the
same arguments previously used against the necessity of following
single federal district judges in the earlier general federal question cases
has been extended to the previously stable field of three-judge courts
and state criminal laws. The effort of the states to redefine their role in
constitutional litigation may simply be an anomaly of federalism. But
the effect is felt most by those whose rights under state criminal laws
are left unsettled because the validity of the law is unsettled.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: STATE COURT INDEPENDENCE
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

In United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods43 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relator's writ
year Tire & Rubber Co., 160 So. 530 (Ala. 1935); Smith v. Cowell, 92 P. 20, 24 (Colo. 1907);
Brenen v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 178 N.Y.S. 846 (A.D. 1919); Waller v. Eanes'
Adm'r, 157 S.E. 721, 723 (Va. 1921); Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 172 P. 725,
726 (Utah 1918).
40 Brown v. Palmer Clay Prod. Co., 195 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1935), aff'd, 297 U.S. 227,
56 S. Ct. 450, 80 L. Ed. 655 (1936); cf. United States v. Bize, 86 F. Supp. 939, 944 (D. Neb.
1949), stating that a statute which a federal district court has held unconstitutional,
should not be regarded as void pending appeal. Compare State v. Intoxicating Liquors.
49 A. 670, 672 (Me. 1901), with State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 67 A. 317 (Me. 1907). Compare
Noble v. Dibble, 205 P. 1049 (Wash. 1922), with Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 43 S. Ct.
303, 67 L. Ed. 590 (1923), rev'g 274 F. 672 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
41 American Law Institute, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
FEDERAL COURTS § 1373, at 13 (1968).

BETWEEN STATE AND

42 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415, 84 S. Ct. 461,
465, 11 L. Ed.2d 440, 445 (1964); In re Sandhagen's Estate, 107 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (Sur. Ct.
1951). That the federal courts are generally regarded as the primary interpreters of federal
law and the Constitution but their decisions on federal questions are often considered as
no more than "persuasive" or "of great weight" is but one of the obvious contradictions

in this area.
48

432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

(1971).
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of habeas corpus. Lawrence had been convicted of violating a city
ordinance which was declared unconstitutional by the federal district
court in an unrelated case while his appeal was pending. 44 In his opinion Justice Swygert stated:
[B]ecause lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction
over state tribunals, decisions
of lower federal courts are not con45
courts.
state
on
clusive
The relator claimed that: the supremacy clause of the Constitution required the state court in a subsequent case to follow the federal court's
interpretation of the ordinance and its declaration of invalidity. 46 The
court of appeals rejected this contention, citing State v. Coleman47 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a recent decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declaring a constitutional
right of due process in a criminal prosecution was not binding upon
48
the states within the circuit.
In passing on federal constitutional questions, the state courts and
the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy
the same position; there is parallelism but not paramountcy for
both sets of courts are
governed by the same reviewing authority of
49
the Supreme Court.
In citing Coleman the court stated, "[W]e have found no federal
court decisions dealing directly with the point . . ." of whether a state
court is bound under the supremacy clause by a federal district court's
ruling that a state statute or municipal ordinance is unconstitutional.5 0
Thus Lawrence became the primary authority for the most recent line
of cases. The court in Lawrence, however, overlooked Owsley v. Peyton 5' and chose to ignore Commonwealth v. Negri52 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, also in the Third Circuit, adopted the same
interpretation which was rejected in Coleman. The Pennsylvania court
declared that in absence of a Supreme Court opinion, the court of
53
appeals is the ultimate forum of the state for all practical purposes.
44 Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 220, 89 S. Ct.
455, 21 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1968).
45 United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1970).
46 Id. at 1075.
47 214 A.2d 393 (N.J. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950, 86 S. Ct. 1210, 16 L. Ed.2d 212
(1966).
48 Id. at 403.
49 Id. at 403.
5o United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072, 1076 (7th Cir. 1970).
51 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965). "Though state courts may for policy reasons follow
the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, (citation omitted)
they are not obliged to do so." (Footnote omitted.)
52215 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965).
53 Id. at 672.
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The court reasoned that a rejection of the court of appeals' doctrine
54
might result in a serious problem of forum shopping.
The prosecution in Lawrence was under a city ordinance; thus, the
state court was not opposing a judgment of a three-judge court. 55 However, the Lawrence cycle was repeated in Texas when the state court
in Pruett v. State5" affirmed appellant's sodomy conviction under a
statute which had previously been declared unconstitutional by a threejudge district court. 57 The court in Pruett cited Lawrence as authority
and further pointed out that the declaration of invalidity was not final
because it was still on appeal. 58 The federal district court had held that
the entire statute was void on its face and had issued an injunction
against future prosecutions under the statute5" but had also dismissed
the claim of a party similarly situated to Pruett.60
The confusion is marked by other recent cases. In State v. McCluney6' a state court again rejected the declaratory judgment of a
three-judge court purporting to invalidate a state criminal law.6 2 Citing
Lawrence, the court asserted the primary responsibility which state
courts have to interpret state laws and the coordinate position such
3
courts share with lower federal courts on federal questions.1
But there has been no unanimity in the recent cases. In People v.
Stansberry, 4 Lawrence was again cited as the state court affirmed the
conviction of defendant based upon evidence procured in a manner
previously declared unconstitutional by the court of appeals for that
circuit. But the state court narrowed its reliance upon Lawrence and
its reasoning. It expressed no absolute certainty that a state court is not
bound by a lower federal decision. Rather, it noted "a lack of unanimity
among the several States .
6...,5
The court further noted that lower
federal courts were in disagreement on the issue at hand and stated
Id.
55 Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 332, 65 S. Ct. 280, 281, 89 L. Ed. 274, 279
(1945). The three-judge court statute is inapplicable to suits challenging local ordinances
or statutes having only local application.
56 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 1379,
28 L. Ed.2d 643, rehearing denied, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 2203, 29 L. Ed.2d 690 (1971).
57 Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex 1970), vacated sub nom., Wade v.
Buchanan, - U.S. - 91 S. Ct. 1221, 28 L. Ed.2d 526 (1971).
58 Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 1379, 28 L. Ed.2d 643, rehearing denied, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 2203, 29
L. Ed.2d 690 (1971).
59The injunction issued was merely against future prosecutions by the district attorney
of Dallas County. The effect of the court's judgment on all others was no greater than
that of a declaratory judgment.
60 Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F.Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nora., Wade v.
Buchanan, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 1221, 28 L, Ed.2d 526 (1971).
61 180 S.E.2d 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
62 Accord, Greene v. State, 273 A.2d 830, 833 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971).
63 State v. McCluney, 180 S.E.2d 419, 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
64 268 N.E.2d 431 (11. 1971).
65 Id. at 433.
54
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that under these circumstances, the non-binding rule was the most
logical. 66
However, a Texas court was faced with a Fifth Circuit construction
of a constitutional right without contrary holdings in other federal
courts. Following the decision in Robinson v. Beto6 7 the court in Ex

parte Griffith68 held that the federal court's interpretation was "now
mandatory as a constitutional requirement. ..."69
The federal courts also seem to be somewhat confused, as they might
well be. What value is the special jurisdiction of the three-judge court
when its decisions may be totally ignored by the state courts? The earlier
case of Owsley v. Peyton70 held that a court of appeals' decision interpreting a constitutional right of a state court defendant had no binding
effect upon the states within its circuit. Yet following Pruett, another
Texas district court proceeded upon the opposite assumption. In
Dawson v. Vance 71 the court upheld the same sodomy statute previously
declared unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Batchelor.72 But the opinion
of the court was completely oblivious to the many Texas cases 73 which
had subsequently ignored Buchanan v. Batchelor although recognizing the sensitive nature of an invalidation of a state criminal law.
It is clear that a viable federalism would be seriously impaired,
perhaps undermined in time, by precipitate [federal] equitable
interference with state prohibition of heinous crimes. For instance:
If an equity court declared such a statute unconstitutional for
rhetorical overbreadth, could not the general wrong be committed
with impunity prior to the redrafting of the statute ... ?74
The answer of course is no; the state courts have demonstrated as
much. 75 The problem thus raised is what is the effect of a declaratory
judgment that a statute is invalid unaccompanied by an injunction
prohibiting enforcement.
66 Id.

67 426 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1970).
68 457 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
69 Id. at 65.
70 352 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1965).
7 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
72 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub nom., Wade v. Buchanan, U.S. -,
91 S. Ct. 1221, 28 L. Ed.2d 526 (1971).
73 Everette v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d
191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 1379, 28 L. Ed.2d 643,
rehearing denied, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 2203, 29 L. Ed.2d 690 (1971); Langston v. State,
460 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Oliver v. State, 459 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970).
74 Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
7V See Everette v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Pruett v. State, 463
S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 1379, 28 L. Ed.2d
643, rehearing denied, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 2203, 29 L. Ed.2d 690 (1971); Langston v.
State, 460 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Oliva v. State, 459 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970).
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The three-judge court act antedated the Declaratory Judgment Act7 6
and has not been substantially altered since. The three-judge court is
thus still to be convened only when an injunction is sought,77 but must
consider independently a request for declaratory relief 78 and a declaratory judgment may be granted without an injunction." This is in fact
a favored method of doing justice to the parties while avoiding excessive conflict. Also, because an injunction is only to be issued when there
is no adequate remedy at law,80 some courts have held it a necessity to
first issue the declaratory judgment without an injunction.8 - Then if
the state persists in attempting to prosecute the party who has obtained
the judgment, or any other party similarly situated, the federal court
s2
could enjoin the proceedings instituted against him.
The effect, then, of a declaratory judgment invalidating a state
criminal law is to allow further state prosecutions under the statute of
only those persons who are not similarly situated to the party obtaining
the judgment. Thus, the state may continue to prosecute those parties
whose conduct is subject to proper regulation by the state,8 for it is
not enough that a statute is unconstitutional, it must be so as to the
4
party who claims a deprivation of a constitutional privilege.
In Babbitz v. McCann"5 the petitioner was granted a judgment declaring Wisconsin's anti-abortion law to be unconstitutional, but his
request for an injunction against future prosecutions under the law
was denied. The court expressed confidence that the state courts would
vindicate Dr. Babbitz's constitutional rights and a reluctance to enjoin
76 Dedaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (now 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202
[1970]).
77 Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 422 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1970).
78 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254, 88 S. Ct. 391, 399, 19 L. Ed.2d 444, 454 (1967).
But cI. Samuels v. Mackell, - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 764, 27 L. Ed.2d 688 (1971).
79 Id.
80 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923); Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82.
81 Gregory v. Gaffney, 322 F. Supp. 238, 240 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Babbitz v. McCann, 310
F. Supp. 293, 296 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 12, 27 L. Ed.2d 1
(1970); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (D.C. N.C. 1969).
82 See, e.g., Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219, 221 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, - U.S.
-,
91 S.Ct. 1375, 28 L. Ed.2d 643 (1971). See also Moffman v. Lehnhausen, 269 N.E.2d
465, 469 (111. 1971), stating, ". . one of the consequences [of stare decisis] is that a legal
doctrine established in a case involving a single litigant characteristically benefits all others
similarly situated." (Emphasis added.)
83 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970); Everette
v. State, 465 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Grim. App. 1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1970), appeal dismissed, - U.S. -, 91 S.Ct. 1379, 28 L. Ed.2d 643, rehearing denied,
U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 2203, 29 L. Ed.2d 690 (1971); Langston v. State, 460 S.W.2d 909 (rex.
Crim. App. 1970); Oliva v. State, 459 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Grim. App. 1970).
84 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S. Ct. 519, 522, 4 L. Ed.2d 524, 529 (1960).
"[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."
85 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 12, 27 L. Ed.2d 1
(1970).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol3/iss2/5

10

Cliffe: The Relationship of State and Lower Federal Courts in Criminal Co

1971]

COMMENTS

state officers.8 6 When the court was subsequently petitioned for further
relief, 7 it found that the state planned to continue the prosecution of
Dr. Babbitz and to regard the statute as constitutional until there was
a decision to the contrary by the United States Supreme Court.8 8 The
court then issued an injunction against Babbitz's prosecution. 9
The court noted that although its judgment might not be literally
binding on the state courts, there also might never be a Supreme Court
review of its opinion, in which case the state would totally ignore its
decision.90 In an argument reminiscent of the period which fostered
the three-judge statute, the court stated:
Did the United States Supreme Court contemplate on the one
hand that a federal three-judge district court must declare the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a state statute and, on
the other hand, that the state authorities may wholly dishonor such
judgment?9 1
The confusion which exists in this area may well be an insoluble
anomaly of federalism which must continue unanswered 9 2 with each
question settled on a case-by-case basis. 93 Although it appears that the
states may ignore a declaratory judgment, they may do so only when
prosecuting one who is not protected by that judgment, or be faced
with a federal injunction. 4 Lower federal courts have demonstrated a
desire to avoid conflict with state courts out of a recognition that they
are courts of concurrent jurisdiction, but they have further demonstrated an unwillingness to sacrifice a defendant's constitutional rights
95
for the sake of comity.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

The federal courts have the last word on any federal question, either
upon direct review by the Supreme Court or consideration of a federal
at 296.
87 Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated,
1375, 28 L. Ed.2d 643 (1971).
88 Id. at 221.
SOld. at 223.
88 Id.

-

U.S.

-,

91 S. Ct.

90 Id.

91 Id. at 223. (Emphasis added.)
92 Comment, Authority in States of Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48
COLUM. L. REv. 943, 945 (1948). "[R]eview by the Supreme Court will result in an independent determination on the merits, and not in a holding that the state was or was not
required to adhere to the federal court ruling as such." See Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165,
167, 59 S.Ct. 134, 135, 83 L. Ed. 104, 106 (1938). Although the Court states that it can decide what effect lower federal court decisions will be given in state courts, the decision
evidences that it will do so only as to an individual case.
93 See Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, 167, 59 S. Ct. 134, 135, 83 L. Ed. 104, 106 (1938).
94 See Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp. 219, 223 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, - U.S. -, 91
S. Ct. 1375, 28 L. Ed.2d 643 (1971).
95 Bastida v. Braniff, 321 F. Supp. 273, 283 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1971).
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habeas corpus application by a lower federal court. 9 The subject of
97
federal habeas corpus is too extensive to be considered in detail here
but bears analysis with regard to the discussion of the role of lower
federal courts in the administration of state criminal statutes. Rashly
used, the federal habeas corpus power may serve as a source of deep
resentment to the states. 98 But if it is exercised sparingly and with due
regard for the interest of the state in administering its criminal statutes,
the power may serve as the necessary threat of a federal remedy to state
constitutional deprivations to ensure that state courts give due respect
to lower federal court decisions while objectively construing their own
statutes.
Federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners was denied
the federal courts until 1867. 91 This alone seems somewhat strange
because the power has been called "a necessary consequence of the
supremacy clause of the federal constitution.' 0 0 Because due process
under the Federal Constitution was not assured until the ratification
of the fourteenth amendment in 1868,101 there was no need for the
power until that time. 1° 2 The congressional grant of jurisdiction over
state court prisoners did not alter the nature of the proceeding; the
proceeding remains merely one to determine the issue of whether the
relator has been afforded due process in his state trial.10 3 The issue of
guilt is not reached in the proceeding, 0 4 so there is no power in the
federal court to reverse a state court conviction; 105 but the application
of the supremacy clause by the federal court makes the "due process"
requirement subject to the interpretations of a lower federal court in
the absence of a Supreme Court opinion on the subject. 10 The federal
district courts insist that because they exercise no appellate jurisdiction
96 The ultimate answer to the concurrent federal question jurisdiction conflict between
state and lower federal courts was suggested before the Constitution was adopted. Hamilton
recognized the power of Congress to establish the lower federal courts as appellate courts

of the state courts on federal questions. THE FEDERALIsT No. 82, at 517 (B. Wright ed. 1970)
(A. Hamilton).
97 See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038 (1970);
Leighton, Federal Supremacy and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 74 (1967).
08 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L. Ed. 761, 767 (1950).
99 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
100 Leighton, Federal Supremacy and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. (1967).
101 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51, 67 S. Ct. 1672, 1675, 91 L. Ed. 1903, 1908
(1947); Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 8 L. Ed.
672, 674 (1833).
102 Leighton, Federal Supremacy and Federal Habeas Corpus, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 74, 77
(1967).
103 Id. at 78.
104 United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922, 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 851, 75 S.Ct. 77, 99 L. Ed. 670 (1954).
105 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 431, 83 S. Ct. 822, 844, 9 L. Ed.2d 837, 864 (1963); Hanna
v. Homes Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 838, 81 S. Ct.
751, 5 L. Ed.2d 747 (1961).
106 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500, 73 S. Ct. 397, 443, 97 L. Ed. 469, 511, rehearing
denied, 345 U.S. 946, 73 S.Ct. 827, 97 L. Ed. 1370 (1953).
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over the state courts, but are rather mere organs of the superior Federal
Constitution, "[I]t is not a case of a lower court sitting in judgment
of a higher court."'10 7 However, the allegations of federal interference
are not in response to the rationale supporting federal habeas corpus but
rather to the misapplication of the procedure.
Although a federal court of appeals may maintain that its interpretations of constitutional standards are not binding on the state courts
within its circuit,108 they are absolutely binding on the federal district
courts in the circuit. 0 9 The end effect is that absent a Supreme Court
decision reversing the court of appeals and federal district court, the
state prisoner will be granted federal habeas corpus relief and the state
will have to ultimately accept the court of appeals' standard.
In Reed v. State 10 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a conviction in which the court admitted evidence of a post-arrest identification
of the defendant from photographs, in the absence of counsel. The
Delaware Supreme Court noted"' that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously held that such identifications were procedurally unconstitutional as violative of the sixth
amendment right to counsel under an extension of the Wade doctrine.
However, the court further noted that the weight of authority held
otherwise, citing opinions of the Supreme Courts of California and
Illinois, and the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth,
Seventh and Tenth Circuits. 112 Reed then applied to the federal district court for habeas corpus relief. 113 The district court recognized
the right of the state court to "pick and choose the applicable law from
competing decisions of other state or federal appellate courts," 114 noted
further support for the Delaware ruling in decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Courts of Mississippi
and Wisconsin and Washington State's Court of Appeals, 115 and then
ordered the discharge of the relator. 116 The court stated that it was duty
bound to follow the legal precedents of the Court of Appeals for the
107 Id. at 510, 73 S. Ct. at 448, 97 L. Ed. at 517.
108 Ralph v. Warden, Md. Pen., 438 F.2d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 1970); Owsley v. Peyton, 352
F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965). Contra, Robinson v. Beto, 426 F.2d 797, 798 (5th Cir. 1970).
109 United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 329 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D. Del. 1971); United
States v. Poston, 312 F. Supp. 587, 598 (D.S.C. 1970).
110 281 A.2d 142 (Del. 1971).
111 Id. at 145.
112 Id. at 146.
113 United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 329 F. Supp. 15 (D. Del. 1971).
114 Id. at 17.
115 Id. at 19.
116 United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, Habeas Corpus No. 140 (D. Del. July 9, 1971)
(unreported order of the court). However, the court did grant a stay of its order of discharge for a reasonable time pending appeal. United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 329
F. Supp. 15, 19 (D. Del. 1971).
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Third Circuit,11 7 even where the controlling decision is by far in the
minority.118
Similar reasoning was employed in Ralph v. Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary19 by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In its
reversal of a denial of relator's habeas corpus application the court held
that a death sentence was unconstitutionally excessive in rape cases
where the victim's life is neither taken nor endangered. 120 Thus, unless
reversed on appeal, the state would be forced to reduce the relator's
sentence. Yet the court of appeals stated that its constitutional standards
"do not 'prescribe a rule of constitutional application to prosecutions in
state courts within this Circuit.' Instead they rest on our supervisory
power over district courts."' 21 Again, the deference paid to the sovereign
state and its "coordinate courts" was entirely semantical.
The Reed example could work havoc with the Lawrence principle
of the non-binding effect of a lower federal court's determination of
the unconstitutionality of a state law. For when petitioned for habeas
corpus relief following a state conviction, prosecution under an unconstitutional statute will be ground for issuing the writ, 122 even after a
voluntary plea of guilty. 123 Thus the state is free to adopt the decision
of the lower federal court-either at the first trial or at some subsequent
trial of the same person following the federal court's nullification of
the conviction.
Federal habeas corpus is not an appeal from a state court decision,
for this might well be violative of the seventh amendment and the
attorneys general of forty-one states failed to persuade the Supreme
24
Court of this argument.
117 United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 329 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D. Del. 1971).
118 Id.
119 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970).
1201d. at 793.

121 Id. at 793. (Citation omitted.)
122 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.2. 313, 10 S. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455 (1890), aff'g In re
Barber, 39 F.641 (C.C.D. Minn. 1889); Ex parte Siebold, 100 US. 371, 375, 25 L. Ed. 717,
718 (1880); United States ex rel. Williams v. Zelker, 445 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, 261 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869, 86
S. Ct. 144, 15 L. Ed.2d 108 (1965).
123 Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847, 89 S.Ct. 132,
21 L. Ed.2d 118 (1969). Compare State of Louisiana ex rel. Picard v. Allgood, 273 F. Supp.
194, 195 (E.D. La. 1967), afl'd, 400 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934, 89
S. Ct. 1208, 22 L. Ed.2d 464 (1969), stating that a voluntary plea of guilty forecloses federal
habeas corpus inquiry into any alleged non-jurisdictional defects, with Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 375, 25 L. Ed. 717, 718 (1880), stating that prosecution under an unconstitutional statute is a jurisdictional defect. However, imprisonment under a statute which
does not operate unconstitutionally in the case of the prisoner does not entitle him to
habeas corpus relief, although the statute may be unconstitutional as to others. Ex parte
Touchman, 24 F. Cas. 73 (No. 14,108) (E.D. Va. 1875).
124 United States ex rel. Elliott v. Hendricks, 213 F.2d 922, 924 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 851, 75 S. Ct. 77, 99 L. Ed. 670 (1954). The court distinguished between the issues
of guilt determined by the state court and the issues of due process determined by the
federal court.
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But the effect is the same.
Habeas corpus is in effect substituted for appeal, seriously disturbing the orderly disposition of state prosecutions and jeopardizing the finality of state convictions .... 125
Federal habeas corpus necessarily involves federal judicial interference, even when properly exercised, for it imposes fourteenth amendment rights upon state trial courts only when they have been denied
-even
though the interpretative standard may be that of a lower
federal court. Thus, the jurisdiction is an exception to the dual system
concept of two distinct judicial hierarchies. It is a "great irritant to
federal state relationships' u 20 but in view of the purpose served, the
"[e]nsuing irritation to the States is a price of federalism .... -127 However, undue irritation must be avoided and the power is properly exercised when restrained to the Holmesian concept as a remedy to a state
court's denial of a fair trial not "of mere disorder, or mere irregularities
in procedure, but of a case where the processes of justice are actually
28
subverted.'
The error complained of should constitute a gross miscarriage of
justice before the writ should issue' 29 to avoid the unseemliness of lower
federal court review and the breeding of "dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction."'8 0 The need, then, is for self-restraint in the exercise of the
federal district courts' discretionary power to issue the writ.
ADDITIONAL NEED FOR HARMONY

It is possible to simply dismiss the state-federal judicial conflict as
an inevitable consequence of a dual judicial system and accept the
125 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 446, 83 S. Ct. 822, 853, 9 L. Ed.2d 837, 873 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting opinion).
0.230(2), at 2704 (2d ed. 1959).
126 1A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAenCE
127 Id. at 2705.
128 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347, 35 S. Ct. 582, 595, 59 L. Ed. 969, 988 (1914)
(Holmes, J., dissenting opinion).
129 Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 173, 77 S. Ct. 1127, 1136, 1 L. Ed.2d 1253, 1265 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
130 Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176 (1949). However, in
1889 one circuit court, in reference to the exercise of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoners, stated: "In the exercise of this jurisdiction there is no conflict between
the authority of the state and of the United States. The state in such case is subordinate,
and the national government paramount." (Emphasis added.) In re Neagle, 39 F. 833, 843
(C.C. N.D. Cal. 1889), aff'd, 135 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 658, 34 L. Ed. 55 (1890). The need for
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state prisoners is evidenced infrequently but emphatically in cases such as Bastida v. Braniff, 444 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1971). The court affirmed
issuance of Bastida's second habeas corpus writ and remanded his case for his third trial
in the Louisiana court of Judge Braniff. Judge Braniff had previously: denied him effective confrontation of witnesses, denied him effective counsel, referred to him as a "pimp
and a church thief" in communications with the federal district court, refused to provide a
transcript of the second trial to the district court, and used the threat of double prosecutions with consecutive sentences and the enticement of parole to dissuade Bastida from
seeking further habeas corpus relief.
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consequences. But insistence upon the Supreme Court as the arbiter of
each conflict means a lengthy delay under an unsettled criminal statute.
The individuals whose rights are thereby made uncertain by an unsettled abortion statute face a legal gamble of their constitutional rights,
a decision to have or permit an unwanted child or risk imprisonment
or loss of a medical license.
The direct appeal statute131 was designed to facilitate a rapid resolution of such important constitutional issues but has provided instead
an obstacle to rapid review of all Supreme Court matters. For while
there were 108 three-judge cases heard in the first sixteen years following the enactment of the three-judge statute, there now are almost that
many heard in the Fifth Circuit alone in one year." 2 The Supreme
Court has stated that since the direct appeal is contrary to the general
scheme of the Court's control over its own docket and in order to keep
its appellate docket within narrow confines, the statutes are to be very
narrowly construed. 1 3 They have therefore held in three recent cases
that there is no right of direct appeal from a three-judge decision which
does not actually grant or deny an injunction."3 4 Each was an appeal of
a declaratory judgment only.
Each of the three cases involved some special reason why the issue
of declaratory relief had been considered separately from that of injunctive relief. But one three-judge court has interpreted the Court's
decisions as a plea for help and has adopted the interpretation that it
may defeat the burdensome direct appeal by totally declining to rule
135
on the request for a declaratory judgment.
13128 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970):

Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from
an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent
injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to
be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.
132 Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910, 912 n.5 (5th Cir. 1968). Judge Brown, Chief Judge of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reported that "As of November 1, 1968, there
were 100 3-judge cases pending in the Fifth Circuit ....
In the 15 months since July 1967
I have constituted 109 3-Judge Courts." Of the 362 cases on the Court's 1971-1972 appellate
docket held over from the previous docket, 66 were direct appeals from three-judge district
courts. 40 U.S.L.W. 3005-3010 (July 3, 1971).
133 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 250, 61 S. Ct. 480, 483, 85 L. Ed. 800, 804 (1941).
134 Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 390, 90 S. Ct. 2013,
2017, 26 L. Ed.2d 684, 689 (1970); Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427, 430, 90 S. Ct. 1763,
1765, 26 L. Ed.2d 378, 381 (1970); Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820,
90 S. Ct. 1517, 25 L. Ed.2d 806 (1970). See, e.g., Long Island Viet Nam War Moratorium
Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1970), af'g 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y.), petition for
cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3438 (U.S. March 24, 1971) (No. 1507, 1970 Term; renumbered No.
70-102, 1971 Term).
135 Gregory v. Gaffney, 322 F. Supp. 238, 241 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
We think it wholly impractical, if not impossible, for the Supreme Court to effectively
consider what now could well be several hundred direct appeals per annum from
three-judge courts .... Although we will not hesitate to grant injunctive relief upon a
showing of necessity, we are convinced that we should not routinely generate direct
appeals to an already overburdened Supreme Court when another adequate remedy
will suffice.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol3/iss2/5

16

Cliffe: The Relationship of State and Lower Federal Courts in Criminal Co

1971]

COMMENTS

It is possible that this approach is a distortion of the Court's decisions and will be regarded by the Court as an effective denial of injunctive relief. But this decision may very well be grasped by the Court
as the sought-for method of regaining a better control over its crowded
docket. If so, the effect will be great because of the general practice
of granting only declaratory relief and the desire of lower courts to
follow the wishes of the Supreme Court. The result would be an even
longer delay required before review of district court decisions declaring state criminal laws unconstitutional and an even greater need for
the two systems of courts to harmonize their decisions. The state courts
must accept the fact that Supreme Court review will be an exception,
not the rule, while lower federal courts remain also cognizant of this
fact in seeking to minimize the need for review.
CONCLUSION

The Pruett and Lawrence decisions are not startling. They merely
represent a proper regulation of prohibited conduct under a statute
which has been found defective as applied to a different set of circumstances. 3 6 But the Babbitz and Reed situations must not be repeated
unless complete disrespect between the two systems of courts breeds
dangerous conflicts. These two cases demonstrate the two superior
powers of injunction and habeas corpus which will result in federal
district court superiority in any single case. But to ensure the state
courts their rightful place in the administration of their own laws and
ensure the minimization of conflicts necessary to avoid undue uncertainty over the validity of state criminal statutes and convictions, the
lower federal courts must: exercise greater discretion in the use of their
powers.
The Lawrence principle need not toll the abdication of the lower
federal courts', especially the three-judge courts', role in criminal constitutional litigation. It merely raises the question of when will the
federal remedy be effective.
When the question is finally answered, the doors of the federal
courts will be open or closed, not only to a physician or pregnant
married woman in Madison, Wisconsin, but to blacks in Mississippi, slum dwellers in.Harlem, and grape pickers in California.
A federal court must not be headstrong. But amenity among state
and federal judicial officials must never cause a federal court to
close its doors to those to whom the door should open. 137
136 "[A] tainted statute is generally unenforced in a particular case only, it may or may
not have wider effects .... in another case it may be valid, a change in circumstance may
produce a change of decision .... " Borchard, Book Review, 45 YALE L.J. 1533, 1534 (1936).
137 Kennan v. Warren, 328 F. Supp. 525, 534 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
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